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AN UNAPPEALING DECISION FOR NEW YORK DWI 
DEFENDANTS 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT 
People v. Pealer1 
(decided November 18, 2011) 
 
Robert Pealer appealed his conviction of two counts of felony 
driving while intoxicated, (hereinafter “DWI”)2 on grounds that the 
submission of “breath test documents”3 into evidence violated his 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.4  Pealer argued that the 
breath test documents were testimonial in nature.5  He alleged that by 
allowing the documents into evidence, the trial court deprived him of 
his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.6  
The Appellate Division unanimously held that the breath test docu-
ments were non-testimonial; and therefore, their admission into evi-
dence was not a violation of Pealer‟s rights.7 
Officer Kirk Crandall stopped Robert Pealer on October 19, 
2008 at approximately 1:28 A.M., because his vehicle had a sticker 
on one of its windows in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law Sec-
tion 375.8  The Officer had also previously received an anonymous 
 
1 933 N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2011). 
2 Pealer was charged under N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192[2] (McKinney 2009), and 
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §  1193[1][c][ii] (McKinney 2010).  Id. at 474. 
3 Id. (Breath test documents refers to both the breath test calibration and simulator solu-
tion certificates, both of which are “used to establish that the breath test machine used in a 
particular case is accurate, a necessary foundational requirement for the admission of breath 
test results.”)  Id. 
4 Id. at 474; the Sixth Amendment in pertinent part states: “to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
5 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 475. 
8 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375 (McKinney 2012). 
1
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tip that Pealer was driving while intoxicated.9  While speaking with 
Pealer, Officer Crandell smelled an odor of alcohol, and noticed that 
Pealer‟s eyes were red and glassy and his speech was impaired.10  
Pealer was then given several sobriety tests, including a preliminary 
alcohol screen, which he failed.11  Officer Crandell then placed Pealer 
under arrest for DWI.12  Upon being transported to the Sheriff‟s Of-
fice, Pealer agreed to submit to a breath test.13  After a bench trial, 
Pealer was convicted of two counts of felony DWI.14 
On appeal, Pealer argued that the trial court erred in admitting 
the breath test documents into evidence.15  The error alleged was that 
by admitting the breath test documents into evidence, without allow-
ing Pealer the opportunity to cross-examine the examiner who certi-
fied the documents, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation.16  However, the Appellate Division unanimously held 
that the breath test documents were non-testimonial, because “the on-
ly relevant fact established by the documents is that the breath test in-
strument was functioning properly” and “[t]he functionality of the 
machine, however, neither directly establishes an element of the 
crimes charged nor inculpates any particular individual.”17  The Ap-
pellate Division reasoned that because the documents were non-
testimonial, Pealer‟s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not 
violated, under the Supreme Court‟s holding in Crawford v. Wash-
ington,18 and the New York Court of Appeals‟ holding in People v. 
Brown.19 
 
9 Pealer I, 899 N.Y.S.2d 62, 1 (Yates Co. Ct. 2009). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 2. 
12 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474.  Note that Pealer challenged the submission of the sam-
ple he provided collaterally by way of challenging the documents that certified the machine 
was functioning properly at the time he submitted his sample.  Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 474-75. 
18 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
19 Pealer II, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 475; People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009).  See 
generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2
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I. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The seminal case of modern Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence is Crawford v. Washington.20  In Crawford, the Supreme Court 
held that testimonial statements by witnesses, who do not appear in 
court, cannot be introduced into evidence without violating a defen-
dant‟s Sixth amendment right to confrontation.21  In Crawford, de-
fendant Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted 
murder.22  At trial he claimed that he stabbed the man in self-
defense.23  At issue was the recorded statement Crawford‟s wife 
made to investigators shortly after the stabbing.24  At trial, the prose-
cution used this ex parte statement against Crawford and it served to 
undermine his claim of self-defense.25  Crawford objected to the use 
of his wife‟s statement as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation, because he was unable to cross-examine her.26  How-
ever, the trial court allowed her statement into evidence under the 
Ohio v. Roberts27 exception to the Confrontation Clause.28  After a 
jury trial, Crawford was found guilty of aggravated assault with a 
deadly weapon.29 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question 
of whether the use of a testimonial statement, which conforms to the 
Roberts exception, violates an accused‟s Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation.30  The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and 
overruled the Roberts exception as being inconsistent with the fra-
mer‟s intention in drafting the Sixth Amendment.31  The Court held 
 
20 Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
21 Id. at 54. 
22 Id. at 40. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41. 
26 Id. at 40.  Washington‟s marital privilege prohibits one spouse from testifying against 
the other without the consent of the other spouse.  Id. at 40. 
27 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 
36 (2004). 
28 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.  Under the Roberts exception, out of court statements by wit-
nesses who are unavailable to testify can be introduced into evidence if the Judge determines 
it falls within a “ „firmly rooted hearsay exception‟ or bears „particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.‟ ”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
29 Id. at 41. 
30 Id. at 42. 
31 Id. at 67-69. 
3
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that in order to admit out of court testimonial evidence, the Confron-
tation Clause requires that the witness must be unavailable to testify, 
and defendant must have had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.32 
In Crawford, the Court opted to fully define testimonial at a 
later date, but stated, that the Confrontation Clause “applies to wit-
nesses against the accused . . . those who „bear testimony.‟ ”33  The 
Court also defined testimony as, “ „a solemn declaration or affirma-
tion made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.‟ ”34  
Next, the Court defined those statements that are clearly testimonial, 
or the “core class of „testimonial‟ statements.”35  The “core class” in-
cludes, “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that 
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prose-
cutorially.”36  While Crawford was a great leap, as it overruled Ro-
berts, the Court by its own admission, was not finished.37  In Melen-
dez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,38 the Court elaborated upon its holding in 
Crawford, providing additional insight into what statements qualify 
as testimonial.39 
The Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz that forensic la-
boratory certificates that served the same purpose as an affidavit were 
testimonial.40  In Melendez-Diaz, Luis Melendez-Diaz was charged 
under state law with distributing and trafficking cocaine.41  At trial, in 
spite of Melendez-Diaz‟s objection, the court allowed into evidence 
certificates that stated the substances seized at the time of his arrest 
were cocaine.42  On appeal, Melendez-Diaz argued that his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the trial court 
 
32 Id. at 68-69. 
33 Crawford, 541 U.S. 51. 
34 Id. (quoting WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 68 (stating “we leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive defi-
nition of „testimonial‟ ”). 
38 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
39 Id. at 2532. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 2530. 
42 Id. at 2530-31. 
4
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allowed the certificates into evidence.43  The Appeals Court of Mas-
sachusetts affirmed the trial court based on the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court‟s holding in Commonwealth v. Verde,44 that 
“the authors of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to con-
frontation under the Sixth Amendment.”45  Accordingly, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied review.46 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question 
of whether the admission of the certificates violated Melendez-Diaz‟s 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.47  Quoting Crawford, the 
Court stated that the certificates were clearly an affidavit because 
they were a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 
of establishing or proving some fact.”48  Furthermore, the Court 
placed additional emphasis on the purpose of the statement, and ac-
cording to Massachusetts law,49 the certificates “sole purpose” was to 
provide “prima facie evidence” at trial.50  Additionally, the certifi-
cates sought to establish that defendant was in possession of cocaine 
at the time of his arrest, which was an element of the crime for which 
defendant was charged.51  The Court stated that this case was a sim-
ple application of its holding in Crawford, because that decision men-
tioned affidavits as falling within the “core class of testimonial state-
ments.”52  Therefore, the Court held the certificates were 
testimonial.53  Finally, the Court also provided additional insight into 
what statements qualify as testimonial, and in a footnote stated, “doc-
uments prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may 
well qualify as nontestimonial records.”54 
Recently, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of 
 
43 129 S. Ct. at 2531. 
44 870 N.E.2d 676 (2007). 
45 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. 
46 Id.; see also 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (denying review). 
47 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. 
48 Id. at 2532. 
49 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 13 (West 2011) (stating “when properly executed, 
[the affidavit] shall be prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight 
of the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or chemical analyzed or the net weight of 
any mixture containing the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or chemical analyzed”). 
50 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
51 Id. at 2533. 
52 Id. at 2542. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 2532 n.1. 
5
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testimonial in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.55  In Bullcoming, the Su-
preme Court held a blood alcohol report was testimonial and that the 
surrogate testimony of another analyst who did not participate in the 
testing was not adequate to satisfy defendant‟s Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation.56  In Bullcoming, defendant, Donald Bullcom-
ing, was charged with aggravated DWI.57  At trial, the prosecution 
submitted into evidence a blood alcohol test that certified that Bull-
coming‟s blood alcohol content was higher than the legal limit.58  The 
prosecution called an analyst to testify who was familiar with the 
procedures of the lab, but who had not personally tested or observed 
the test that was performed on Bullcoming‟s blood.59  The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico held that the blood alcohol test was testimoni-
al, but indicated that the “live testimony of another analyst satisfied 
the constitutional requirements.”60  The Supreme Court of New Mex-
ico affirmed Bullcoming‟s conviction, reasoning that because the 
analyst merely transcribed the results produced by the machine, 
another analyst, familiar with the machine and its workings, satisfied 
the Sixth Amendment‟s guarantee of confrontation.61 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the 
Confrontation Clause prohibited the testimony of a substitute ana-
lyst.62  The Court answered this question in the affirmative and re-
jected the Supreme Court of New Mexico‟s reasoning.63  First, the 
Court reasoned that an analyst‟s testimony attests to more than just 
the results, it also attests to the procedures used in obtaining them.64  
Therefore, the testimony of a substitute analyst fails to adequately re-
veal any errors in that process.65  Next, the Court dealt with the issue 
of whether the blood analysis was testimonial.66  The Court examined 
the purpose of the statement as it did in Melendez-Diaz, and stated 
 
55 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
56 Id. at 2713. 
57 Id. at 2709. 
58 Id. at 2712. 
59 Id. at 2709. 
60 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-10. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 2710. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 2714. 
65 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715. 
66 Id. at 2716. 
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that “a document created solely for an „evidentiary purpose,‟ . . . 
made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial.”67  Addi-
tionally, the Court found that the fact that the statement was not 
sworn was not “dispositive.”68  Finally, the court found that the 
statement sought to establish a fact at trial, and thus was testimoni-
al.69 
II. THE NEW YORK APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE 
The New York Court of Appeals stated in People v. Raw-
lins,70 that the Confrontation protections afforded under the New 
York Constitution71 are the same as the protections provided under 
the Sixth Amendment.72  Therefore, the question is not whether the 
New York State Constitution provides greater protections than the 
Sixth Amendment, but rather whether the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in interpreting Crawford, affords greater protections through its 
definition of testimonial.  The seminal case in which the New York 
Court of Appeals defined testimonial is Rawlins.73 
In Rawlins, the New York Court of Appeals combined the ap-
peals of People v. Rawlins and People v. Meekins.74  In Rawlins, de-
fendant, Michael Rawlins, appealed after he was convicted of six 
counts of third-degree burglary, after a jury trial.75  Defendant, Mi-
chael Rawlins, was arrested after his fingerprints were recovered 
from the scene of a burglary.76  Based upon similarities between this 
burglary and four prior incidents, Rawlins was arrested and charged 
 
67 Id. at 2717 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2522). 
68 Id. 
69 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716. 
70 884 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 2008). 
71 New York State‟s Constitution states, in pertinent part: “In any trial in any court what-
ever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as 
in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him or her.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
72 Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d at 1025; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (the Court of Appeals 
compared the language of the New York State Constitution with the language of Sixth 
Amendment, and found because the wording was similar the rights were intended to be the 
same). 
73 Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d 1033. 
74 884 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 2008). 




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
920 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
with five burglaries, totaling six counts of third-degree burglary.77 
At issue in Rawlins was the admission of a latent fingerprint 
comparison, which was made by a detective who did not testify.78  
Before trial, the case was assigned to Detective Connolly, who re-
viewed the prints recovered from all five burglaries and made his de-
termination that all of the prints matched.79  However, prior to Con-
nolly‟s investigation, Detective Beatty prepared a report on only two 
of the prior burglaries.80  At trial, both reports were admitted into 
evidence, however, while Detective Connolly testified as to his find-
ings, Detective Beatty did not.81  After a jury trial Rawlins was con-
victed of all six counts.82 
On appeal, Rawlins argued that the trial court erred in admit-
ting Beatty‟s report in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.83  
The Court of Appeals found that the admission of Beatty‟s report was 
a violation of Rawlins‟ right to confrontation.84  However, the court 
found the error was harmless, because the report merely restated the 
information that was also contained in Detective Connolly‟s report.85  
In determining whether the fingerprint analysis was testimonial, the 
court relied on two factors.86  First, the court looked at “whether the 
statement was prepared in a manner resembling ex parte examina-
tion.”87  Next, the court asked, “whether the statement accuse[d] the 
defendant of criminal wrongdoing.”88  The court refused to create a 
bright-line rule, insisting on a case-by-case analysis.89  The court rea-
soned that the “facts and context are essential” to the determination 
 
77 Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d at 1022-23. Note the discrepancy of six counts of burglary to five 
break-ins, is due to the fact that one incident involved two businesses which shared a build-
ing. 
78 Id. at 1023. 
79 Id. at 1022-23. 
80 Id. at 1023. 
81 Id. 
82 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1022. 
83 Id. at 1023. 
84 Id. at 1034. 
85 Id. at 1033. 
86 Id. 
87 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.  Note the court did not confine the test to only two factors 
but stated, “it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of factors that may enter into the 
mix.”  Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1029. 
8
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of whether a statement is testimonial.90  The court also emphasized 
the importance of the declarant‟s purpose in making the statement.91  
The court found the analysis resembled ex parte examination because 
it was prepared solely for use at trial.92  Moreover, the court also 
found the statement was accusatory because it attempted to establish 
that defendant committed the crime.93 
In People v. Meekins,94 the companion case to Rawlins, de-
fendant, Dwain Meekins, was convicted by a jury of “first-degree 
sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and third-degree robbery.”95  At 
issue was a DNA report prepared by an independent laboratory.96  
The report was an analysis of the samples acquired from the rape-kit 
collected by the police after the crime.97  At trial, an employee of the 
laboratory and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner testified as 
to the results of the DNA analysis.98  However, neither had partici-
pated in the testing.99  On appeal, Meekins argued that the DNA re-
port admitted into evidence was testimonial because it was prepared 
solely for use at trial and its purpose was to establish the identity of 
the suspect who committed the crime.100  The Court of Appeals held 
that the DNA report was non-testimonial, and its admission into evi-
dence did not violate defendant‟s right of Confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment.101 
In Meekins, the court focused on the nature of the report and 
found it was not “the kind of ex parte testimony the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to protect against.”102  Of critical importance 
was the fact that the report was not discretionary or based on the ana-
lyst‟s opinions, but rather was the product of scientific analysis.103  
The court stated that the report was not accusatory because, by itself, 
 




94 884 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 2008). 





100 Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034. 
101 Id. 
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it “shed no light” on whether Meekins was innocent or guilty.104 
In People v. Freycinet,105 the Court of Appeals held that a re-
dacted autopsy report was non-testimonial.106  In Freycinet, defen-
dant, Gary Freycinet, was indicted for “murder, manslaughter and 
other crimes.”107  After a bench trial, Freycinet was acquitted of mur-
der, but found guilty of manslaughter in the second degree.108  The 
Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals granted re-
view.109  On appeal, the court considered whether the admission of a 
redacted autopsy report into evidence violated Freycinet‟s Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation.110 
At issue was an autopsy report performed by a doctor who 
was unavailable to testify, however, the report was redacted to re-
move his opinions.111  While the doctor who performed the autopsy 
was unavailable to testify, another doctor testified as to her own opi-
nions that were formed on the basis of the report.112  The Court of 
Appeals found that because the report was redacted, it was an objec-
tive account of observations and measurements.113  Furthermore, be-
cause the report did not “explicitly link the defendant to the crime” 
the court found it was not accusatory.114  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals held the autopsy report was non-testimonial, and its admis-
sion into evidence was not a violation of Freycinet‟s Sixth Amend-




105 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008). 
106 Id. at 846. 
107 Id. at 844. 
108 Id. at 845. 
109 Id. at 845. 
110 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 845. 
111 Id. at 846. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 846.  Note, the court conceded that the autopsy report contained some observa-
tions that required judgment, such as classifying a wound to the victim as a stab wound.  Id.  
However, these observations did not make the report testimonial, because they were “con-
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III. RECONCILING THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK APPROACHES 
TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court‟s approach, as stated in Crawford and its 
progeny, is concerned with the type of statement being made, and 
whether it bears testimony against the defendant.116  In Crawford, the 
Court recognized certain statements are within the “core class” of tes-
timonial statements, such as police interrogations and affidavits.117  
However, the Court refused to create a bright line rule and overturned 
the Roberts exception.118  In Melendez-Diaz, the Court reaffirmed its 
prior holding in Crawford—that testimonial statements are inadmiss-
ible unless the witness is unable to testify and defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to confront.119  However, the Court also stated that 
the “core-class of testimonial statements” were merely the heart of 
what the Confrontation Clause was seeking to redress, but not its 
“limit,” leaving room for lower courts to define testimonial.120  Final-
ly, the Court in Bullcoming further elaborated upon its decision in 
Crawford, holding that any document prepared for the sole purpose 
of establishing a fact at trial is testimonial,121 and that a substitute 
witness is never adequate for a testimonial statement.122 
At the heart of the Supreme Court‟s approach to determining 
whether a statement is testimonial, is the Sixth Amendment‟s plain 
command that defendants have the right to confront their accusers.123  
The Court‟s holdings appear to reflect this command, as they have 
been limited to statements by witnesses, or those statements that bear 
testimony against the accused.124  This ensures that defendants have a 
fair opportunity to confront those whose testimony is used against 
them.125  Next, the Court has emphasized the importance of the 
 
116 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
117 Id. at 51-52. 
118 Id. at 68. 
119 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542. 
120 Id. at 2534. 
121 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
122 Id. at 2715. 
123 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (stating “[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the 
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Consti-
tution actually prescribes: confrontation”). 
124 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532; Bullcoming, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2717. 
125 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
11
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statements character, evaluating whether its primary purpose is to be 
used at trial.126 
Likewise, New York Courts have followed a similar ap-
proach.  New York‟s approach is also designed to bar statements that 
bear testimony against a defendant, or establish an element of the of-
fense at trial, unless a defendant has an opportunity to confront wit-
nesses.127  The most notable distinction made by the Court of Ap-
peals, is between factual statements and statements which bear 
opinions.128  This distinction is particularly instructive, as it illumi-
nates the difference between accusatory and non-accusatory state-
ments.  As stated in Freycinet, an autopsy report that was redacted to 
remove the opinions of the examining doctor was not accusatory be-
cause it was an objective report of the underlying facts and did not 
bear testimony against defendant.129  The crucial fact was that the re-
port, by itself, did not link defendant to the crime.130  However, the 
opinion generated from the information within the report was testi-
monial because it attempted to link defendant to the crime.”131 
The court in Pealer specifically distinguished its case from 
Bullcoming because the “breath test documents,” or certificates, were 
used only to establish that the machine was working properly.132  The 
key distinction that the court made was that the certificates were non-
testimonial, because by themselves they did not shed any light on de-
fendant‟s “guilt or innocence.”133  While in Bullcoming, the blood test 
analysis on its own provided evidence defendant was intoxicated, 
which was an element of the crime for which he was charged.134  The 
court‟s approach in Pealer is consistent with the New York Court of 
 
126 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716-17; id. at 2719-20 (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 
127 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. 
128 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  This is also not to say that defendant has no recourse to the submission of the re-
ports into evidence.  He is still free to challenge the certificate on other grounds.  70 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS 1 § 8 (1999). 
131 Perhaps a more blunt, but illustrative analogy, is that the court would not permit the 
defendant to raise an objection to his inability to cross examine the bullet recovered from the 
crime scene, but would allow him to raise an objection to being unable to cross-examine the 
ballistics expert who determined the bullet was a match to others fired from his gun. 
132 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S. at 475. 
133 Id. at 474. 
134 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475. 
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Appeals decision in Rawlins and Freycinet.135  Additionally, while 
distinguishable from Bullcoming, the approach is consistent with 
Bullcoming’s holding and the decisions of the Supreme Court.136 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Pealer is not likely to change the analysis of 
whether statements are testimonial under Crawford, in the Fourth 
Department, or within New York‟s courts.  As the Court of Appeals 
has determined, the New York Constitution provides the same protec-
tions as the Sixth Amendment.137  Because New York has followed 
the Supreme Court‟s approach in determining whether statements are 
testimonial, it is no surprise the court‟s decision in Pealer is consis-
tent with both New York and federal law.138  Recently, in People v. 
Hulbert,139 the New York Appellate Division, Third Department 
reached the same conclusion as the court in Pealer.140   
However, the practical implications of this decision are troub-
ling.  At first glance the opinion appears to stand for the principle that 
a person being tried for a crime is barred from challenging the evi-
dence against him.  This is because to a person who is charged with 
DWI, the question of whether the breath test machine was function-
ing properly is of secondary importance, only to the results that it 
produced.141  This decision appears to bar any collateral challenge to 
the test results, as the certificates are entered into evidence without an 
opportunity for confrontation.142  The Appellate Division decided in 
Pealer that the certificates were not testimonial, because they failed 
to establish an element of the crime defendant was charged with.143  
While it must be conceded that the certificate, which attests that the 
breath test machine was working properly by itself does not establish 
an element of the crime, is it not close enough to warrant that defen-
 
135 Compare Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033, and Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846, with Pealer 
II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475. 
136 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475. 
137 Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d at 1025. 
138 Id. 
139 939 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 2012). 
140 Compare Hulbert, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 662, with Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475. 
141 See generally 70 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 8 (1999). 
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dant have an opportunity to cross examine the person who certified 
those documents? 
Although Pealer was distinguished from Bullcoming, there 
are elements of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Bullcoming that ap-
pear applicable to Pealer.144  First, the Court in Bullcoming relied 
upon its holding in Melendez-Diaz that “a document created solely 
for an „evidentiary purpose,‟ . . . made in aid of a police investigation, 
ranks as testimonial.”145  While these certificates are clearly distin-
guishable from those at issue in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, as 
the certificates themselves do not establish Pealer committed a crime, 
they were created solely for an evidentiary purpose—to establish that 
the machine was working properly at trial.146  Therefore, it follows 
that breath test certificates are arguably testimonial.  Second, the 
view that these certificates are testimonial is also supported by Justice 
Sotomayor‟s concurring opinion in Bullcoming.147  Justice Soto-
mayor‟s concurrence suggested an alternative method of determining 
whether a statement is testimonial.148  According to Sotomayor, a 
statement is testimonial if its primary purpose is to create “an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony.”149  Applying this test to the use 
breath test certificates, it appears that the primary purpose of these 
documents is to substitute for in court testimony; the documents seek 
to establish precisely what the employee would be called on to pro-
vide at trial, testimony that the machine was certified to give an accu-
rate reading. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely the Court‟s holding in Bullcoming 
will be extended to find the certificates at issue in Pealer testimoni-
al.150  As noted above, the statements at issue in Melendez-Diaz as 
well as Bullcoming, are distinguishable from Pealer, because those 
statements alone established an element of the crime defendant was 
charged with.151  The certificates at issue in Pealer, while an integral 
part of the prosecution‟s case, do not meet the threshold of testimoni-
 
144 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716-17. 
145 Id. at 2717. 
146 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
147 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719-20 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
148 Id. at 2720. 
149 Id. 
150 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
151 Compare Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716, and Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530, with 
Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75. 
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al, because the statements, on their own, failed to establish an ele-
ment of the crime for which defendant was charged.152  Because the 
certificates do not reach the threshold of testimonial, the Sixth 
Amendment is not invoked, and the admission of the certificates does 
not constitute a violation of Pealer‟s rights.153  Furthermore, in a 
footnote within Melendez-Diaz, the Court stated, “documents pre-
pared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qual-
ify as nontestimonial records.”154  The court in Pealer relied on this 
dicta, finding it to be “indicative on how the Court would rule on the 
issue.”155  Additionally, the Supreme Court in Crawford specifically 
left the issue of the admissibility of non-testimonial statements under 
hearsay exceptions for the state courts.156  Thus, the Supreme Court is 
unlikely to grant certiorari on this issue. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Pealer is that a signifi-
cant part of the prosecution‟s case is exempt from cross-
examination.157  However, the reality is that the certificates could still 
be challenged on other grounds.158  With two of the Appellate Divi-
sion departments holding that breath test certificates are non-
testimonial, it does not appear likely that a challenge to the admission 
of breath test certificates will prevail on confrontation grounds in 
New York courts.159 
 
Christopher Gavin  
 
 
152 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474-45. 
153 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
154 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. 
155 Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475. 
156 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
157 See 70 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 8 (1999) (“Leaving the BAC score unchallenged and hop-
ing that the trier of fact will merely ignore this damaging evidence all but guarantees a ver-
dict of guilty.”). 
158 Id. 
159 See Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d 473, Hulbert, 939 N.Y.S.2d 661. 
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